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THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
TIE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY IN CIVIL CASES IN
JURISDICTIONS WHERE THE PROCEDURE AT
COMMON LAW AND IN EQUITY ARE
BLENDED BY THEIR PRAC-
TICE CODES.*
The discussion of a subject of such a wide scope concerning
a very precious right which for centuries past has been re-
garded as one of the foundations of our liberties, necessarily
demands a restricted treatment and the consideration of only
certain phases of that right in a thesis of this character. No
attempt will be made in this limited discussion to- trace the
historical evolution and development of trial by jury. The
in ;tant discussion will not have to do with that phase of the
right of trial by jury which our forefathers so cherished but
rather with the right of trial by jury in civil cases under the
statutory codes of civil procedure, adopted by approximately
two-thirds of the American States, and which right is by a
few lawyers thought to be not only unnecessary but even an
impediment in the way of an expeditious administration of
justice. This article will only incidentally deal with the con-
stitutional right but will primarily be concerned with trial by
jury as a matter of right in civil cases under the reformed
code procedure where legal and equitable rights are being
tried in a regular court of ordinary jurisdiction. It will be
my endeavor to treat of the right of trial by jury in cases
where there is an ordinary contestation of legal and equitable
claims which are justiciable in a general court that is firmly
established as one of the integral parts of our judicial system
as contradistinguished from special proceedings or par-
ticular actions so often dealt with in a summary manner in
'NOTE.-Awarded Thesis Prize, 1922, Washington University J.aw
School.
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the regular courts or in quasi-judicial tribunals. And further,
this thesis will treat of jury trial as a matter of right where
a party is absolutely entitled to demand it, and not of the jury
trial which may be granted only in the discretion of the court
and in which the jury acts merely in an advisory capacity.
This discussion will treat of trial by jury in civil cases in
all the American States where the procedure at common law
and in equity has been blended by State statutory enactment.'
Within this category will be included those States, commonly
called "Code States," which have adopted codes of civil pro-
cedure similar to the first and great model code adopted in
the American States, namely, the New York Code of Civil
Procedure of 1848; and also those States which are designated
by some writers as "Quasi-Code States," which have by State
statutes adopted procedural reform along similar lines but
have not made such radical changes as were brought about
by the Code of Civil Procedure.
The adoption of the codes of civil procedure by many of the
American States completely revolutionized the nodes of
pleading in all suits at law and in equity.2 By the abolition
of the many forms of action and the substitution of one civil
action, a great change was wrought in all matters of proced-
ure. It seems plain that it was the intent of the legislators to
abolish merely the forms of action at common law and to
make equity procedure applicable to both cases at law and
in equity. According to an eminent authority, the true spirit
of the code reform was to bring the trial of all cases "out of
1. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho. Indi-
ana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri. M'ontana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Gregcn,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming,
have adopted codes of civil procedure. Alabama, Georgia, Massachusetts.
Maryland, Mississippi, Tennessee, Texas and Florida have to a certain
extent blended law and equity procedure by statute. The State of Louisiana
will not be considered in this discussion.
2. Pattison's Missouri Code Pleading, p. 25; Nichols v. Stevens, 123
Mo., 96.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol7/iss4/4
TflE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
the bondage of the law into the liberty of the equitable mode
,of procedure. ' Some authorities have said that by the
atdoption of the codes, the court of chancery as a separate
tribunal was abolished. If this is the true view of the result
of the adoption of the practice codes, nevertheless we find
that all the procedural attributes of the court of equity have
entirely superseded those of the court of law and we have in
the new reforned system all the modes and external forms
of the equity procedure.
Beyond a procedural reform the legislatures could not hope
to go, for the fundamental distinctions between law and equity
were not only inherent in the nature of things but were also
so firmly established and so interwoven in jurisprudence by
the course of decisions for centuries, that it would be most
ilifficult to abrogate them. So the essential and inherent
differences letween the substantive rights at law and in equity
remain today unchanged by the practice acts of the various
Ntates. 4 And it has been held in our own State of Missouri
that the principles which distinguish an action at law from a
suit in equity are to be as clearly regarded and preserved
under our code of civil procedure as they were when law and
equity were administered in different courts.6  It has also
heen held in the State of Missouri that under the code, a party
is entitled to all the relief lie could have formerly obtained
both from a court of law and equity upon the facts." So we
way safely say that the Missouri Code of Civil Procedure
recognizes the distinctions between law and equity and the
test for determiuing the miiode of trial is whether under the
old system, the case was cognizable at law or in equity." And
3. 31 Harv. Law Review, 669.
4. Smith v. Rowe, 4 Cal., 6; Meyers v. Field. 37 Mo., 434; Maguire v.
Tyler, 47 Mo.. 115.
5. Miller v. St. Louis & Kansas City Ry. Co.. 162 Mo., 424.
6. Ranken v. Charleus Co., 19 Mo.. 490.
7. Conran v. Sellew, 28 Mo., 320; Ellis v. Kreutzinger, 31 Mio., 432.
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as the Court said in another Missouri decision: Notwith-
standing the adoption of the code of civil procedure, "equi-
table rights are still to be adjudged according to principles of
equity jurisprudence and legal rights are to be determined
and adjudged by the principles of law."" And such is the
firmly established course of decision in most of the States
that have adopted the reformed procedure. While some state-
ments are found to the effect that the codes abrogate certain
equitable primary rights and curtail the equity jurisdiction,
yet on the whole it may be safely said that the essential dif-
ferences which inhere in the very nature of equitable and
legal rights still exist as clearly fixed as before the codes were
adopted." Granting this, it necessarily follows that the
adoption of the codes of civil procedure did not substantially
change the cases in which jury trial was a matter of right at
common law.
It seems that about two-thirds of the American States have
guaranties in their constitutions, of the right of trial by jury
in civil cases. In some of the States, the constitutions spe-
cifically guarantee the right of trial by jury in civil cases; and
in others, the application to civil cases is in a general pro-
vision, such as---'the right of trial by jury, as heretofore
enjoyed, shall remain inviolate." 10  Such a provision is a
guaranty of the right of trial by jury in general, which leaves
it to judicial construction to determine the civil cases in which
the right existed according to the course of the common law
or former procedure in the State before the adoption of the
Constitution.
It is fundamental that a constitutional provision cannot be
impaired by legislative enactment. So when the reformed
procedure was adopted, the legislators could not by enact-
ment impair the constitutional guaranties; and so it is held
8. Pattison's Mo. Code Pleading, p. 27; Meyers v. Field, 37 Mo., 434.
9. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, see. 354.
10. Missouri Constitution, Art. II, see. 28.
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that wherever the right of trial by jury is preserved in the
organic law of the State, it must exist in the cases in which
it was formerly allowable before the adoption of the code, and
the old distinctions between law and equity must determine the
right. The constitutions of the various States only guarantee
the right of jury trial as it existed at common law or was
secured by statute or recognized by rule of court at the time
of their adoption." Of course, the constitutional guaranties
e.tend only to the fundamental right of trial by jury and are
not violated by minor procedural changes which do not sub-
stantially impair the right. It has also been held, quite uni-
formly, that the constitutional guaranty of jury trial applies
only to cases where an issue of fact is joined on the plead-
ings.12 And as succinctly stated by the Court: "There must
be all action at law, as contradistinguished from a suit in
equity and from a special proceeding * * *, and an issue of
fact joined on the pleadings before a jury trial can be claimed
as a matter of right under the constitutions. ' 1 3
After having reviewed the effect of the adoption of the
practice codes upon civil cases at law and in equity and briefly
treated the prevailing constitutional guaranties of the right
of trial by jury in civil cases, generally in vogue in the
American States, we will now take up the principal discussion
-f trial by jury as a matter of right in civil cases at law and
in equity. It is a well recognized rule that in an action at law,
either party ordinarily is entitled to a jury trial as a matter
right. 14 On the other hand, it is equally well settled that
trial by jury does not as a matter of right extend to equity
11. Lake Erie. Wabash & St. Louis Rd. Co. v. Heath. 9 Ind., 557; Ore-
gon v. Sengste ken. 61 Ore.. 465; Williams v. Citizens etc.. 40 Ark.. 290.
12. Koppikus v. State Capitol Commissioners, 16 Cal.. 249; Minor v.
Burton, 228 Mo.. 558.
13. Porter v. Armstrong, 134 N. C., 447: Koppikus v. State Capitol Com-
missioners. 16 Cal.. 249.
14. Olsen v. Marquis, 88 Neb., 610; Morton Brick and Tile Co. v. Soder-
gren. 130 Minn., 252.
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cases." However, at common law, there were two exceptiorr
to this rule. It appears that trial by jury was a matter of
right in the following cases of equitable cognizance, namely,
where the suit was to divest the title of an heir of a freehold
estate of which his ancestor had died seised; and in cases
where the common law right of the rector of a parish to
tithes was drawn in question.'6 However, these two excep-
tions have become relatively unimportant in recent times. Of
course the right in equity cases may be guaranteed by the
State constitutions or given by legislative enactment." But
the general rule appears to be that cases of clear equitable
cognizance are always triable by the court,'6 and in these cases
the court may determine the issues of fact as well as law. 1"
These observations afford the great test for the existence
of the right of trial by jury. Is the action cognizable at law
or in equity? So the right to a jury trial depends upon whether
the cause of action is essentially legal or essentially equi-
table.20 And it has been held that if the case is not essentially
equitable or some essentially equitable remedy is not invoked,
the parties are entitled to a jury as a matter of right.21 And
in all cases where legal rights are involved and issues of fact
arise upon the pleadings, the parties are entitled to a jury
trial.22 Of course this only applies to actions at law as dis-
tinguished from special proceedings.
It is generally held that the nature of the cause of action
must be determined from the substantive facts pleaded and
15. Brown v. Grier, 16 Ariz., 215; Gresens v. Martin. 27 N. Dak., 231;
Pacific Ry. Co. v. Wade, 91 Cal., 456; Small v. Binford, 41 Ind. App., 440.
16. Raymond v. Flavel, 27 Ore., 219; 2 Daniel on Chancery Practice,
sec. 1080; Proffatt on Jury Trial.
17. Proffatt on Jury Trial.
18. Ely v. Coontz, 167 Mo., 371; Long v. Long, 141 Mo., 352.
19. Sharmer v. McIntosh, 43 Neb., 509.
20. Harrigan v. Gilchrist, 121 Wis., 127; Gallagher v. Basey, 1 Mont.,
457; Smith v. Rowe. 4 Cal., 6.
21. Martin v. Martin. 118 Ind.. 227; McCoy v. Oldham, I Ind. App., 372.
22. Andrews v. Pritchett, 66 N. Car., 387.
232
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not from the kind of relief prayed for or the name given to
the action. In other words, the right of trial by jury must be
determined from the real meritorious controversy between
the parties as shown by the whole case and not from the form
in which the issues are set forth.2 ' And whether an action is
legal or equitable depends on the issues presented and the
relief required at the time of the trial.24  And these things
must be determined from all the pleadings.a
The statutory practice acts in many of the States provide
that all issues of fact in actions for the recovery of money
only, or of specific property must be tried by a jury, unless
waived; and every other issue must be tried by the court."'
What is the effect of these statutory provisions specifically
giving the right of jury trial in some cases and withholding
it in others! In accordance with these specific enactments, it
is generally held in most of these States that the right of
trial by jury must be granted in actions for the recovery of
real property; of personal property; for damages for breach
of contract, and in actions for the recovery of money only.2'
In construing these code provisions, it has been held in
sone of the code States that the right of trial by jury does not
depend upon the character of the principles npon which the
right to relief is based but upon the nature and character of
the relief sought. So if the relief asked for is an action for
money only, "that is all that is required and it is immaterial
whether the right of action is based on what were formerly
regarded as legal or equitable principles." ' 28 But notwith-
standing those decisions, it is usually held that these statutes,
23. Gordon v. Munn. 83 Kans., 242; Bll T. Merrifield, 109 N. Y., 202.
24. Taylor v. Brown, 92 Ohio St. 287.
25. Boam v. Cohen, 94 Kansas, 42.
26. Missouri Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 1398. (R. S. 1919).
27. Gordon v. Munn, 83 Kans., 242; Snell Y. Niagara Paper Mills, 193
N. Y., 433; So. Milwaukee Co. v. NUrphy, 112 Wis., 614; Ragan v. McCoy,
29 Mo., 356.
28. Alsdorf v. Reed, 45 Ohio St., 653; Cobb. v. Edwards, 117 N. Car., 244.
233
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uhich set out specific cases for jury trial, recognaze the dis-
tinctions between law and equity and that the right or trial
by jury is to be determined as at common la%% before the
adoption of the reformed procedure.
As a party may under the code procedure, obtain both legal
and equitable relief in the same action, it becomes necessary
to consider whether in cases where legal and equitable claims
are joined, the party is entitled to a trial by jury. It is
usually held in accord with the New York decisions that where
legal and equitable causes of action are united, the legal
issues must be submitted to a jury.29 This is simply an ex-
tension of the theory that the right of trial by jury cannot be
impaired by the modes of pleading under the codes of civil
procedure. However, it has been held in the New York cases
that an action for both legal and equitable relief in respect
of the same cause of action, is not of right triable by a jui y."
But on the other hand, it seems that where legal and equitable
defenses are united under the code, the defendant is deemed to
have waived his right to a trial by jury.3 '
Under the code form of procedure, a defendant may set
up defenses and counterclaims triable and recoverable upon
in the sanie action. As an equitable defense may be set up
to an action at law, it becomes necessary to determine whether
the action remains one at law and is triable by a jury or
whether it is converted into a case in equity and is triable by
the court. The remaining discussion will be confined to a
consideration of this very important question upon which the
right of trial by jury so often depends.
It has been uniformnly established that an equitable aefense
will not convert an action at law into a suit in equity, where
29. Davis v. Morris, 36 N. Y.. 569.
30. Cogswell v. N. Y., N. H. A H. Ry. Co.. 105 N. Y., 319.
31. Bodley v. Ferguson. 30 Cal., 512; Davison v. Associates of the
Jersey Co.. 71 N. Y.. 333.
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no affirmative relief is asked.3 2 Neither the plaintiff nor de-
fendant loses the right of trial by jury when mere equitable
defenses are interposed.8 3 The test for the ascertainment of
the right of jury trial is whether the equitable defense is
interposed merely for the purpose of defeating the plaintiff's
claim, or for the purpose of obtaining affirmative equitable
relief from him in the same action. So the prevailing rule
in most of the code States is, that if the answer contains not
merely a technical defense, interposed merely for the purpose
of defeating the plaintiff's action, but an independent
equitable cause of action which constitutes a counterclaim
or cross demand and prays for or is entitled to affirmative
equitable relief in favor of the defendant, the action at law
is converted into a suit in equity and is triable by the court."4
The reason for the distinction seems to be that a mere
equitable defense cannot draw to itself a different mode of
trial from the action at law, but an affirmat:ve equitable
defense, being a distinct and independent cause oi action, is of
equal dignity with the claim set forth in the plaintiff's peti-
tion and therefore equally entitled to an appropriate method
of trial. So it has been stated by some authorities that where
the allegations in the answer amount to a cross action or
counterclaim, but for the statutes allowing equitable defenses
and cross actions, a separate suit in equity for affirmative
relief would have to be maintained, such cross action is
32. Kostuba v. Miller, 137 Mo., 161; Lincoln Trust Co. v. Nathan. 175
Mo., 32; Shaffer v. Iella, 191 Mo., 377; Bouton v. Pippin, 192 Mo., 469;
Thompson v. National Bank of Commerce, 132 Mo., App., 225.
33. Moline Plow Co. v. Hartman, 84 Mo., 610; Lincoln Trust Co. v.
Nathan. 175 Mo., 32.
34. Buckner v. Mear, 26 Ohio St., 514; Gill v. Pelkey, 54 Ohio St., 348;
Fish v. Benson, 71 Cal., 428; Marling v. Burlington, Cedar Rapids & North-
ern Ry., 67 Ia., 331; Lewis v. Rhodes, 150 Mo., 498; Pitts v. Pitts, 201 Mo.
356; Withers v. K. C. Suburban Belt Ry. Co., 226 Mo., 373; Pendleton v.
Hubbard, 231 Mo., 314.
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treated like any other suit in equity.' 5 Or if the defendant's
answer admits the facts of the plaintiff's action at law and
sets up facts of an equitable character in avoidance which,
if established, will extinguish or supersede the plaintiff's
claim, the whole case is converted into a suit in equity and
the issues of fact as well as law are triable by the court.3 6
The qualifications to these general rules should now be
called to mind. In order to convert an action at law into a
suit in equity, the defense set up must be substantially
equitable and not a legal defense disguised by the defendant's
allegations that an affirmative equitable claim is involved.3
Of course the defendant must file his cross petition, showing
facts under which he cannot obtain an adequate remedy and
complete relief at law before the case is properly of equitable
cognizance ;38 for if such relief is not necessary to sustain the
defendant's rights and a legal action would afford him ade-
quate relief, the plaintiff is not deprived of the right of trial
by jury.3 And, further, it has been held that the defense
interposed must be a virtual admission of the plaintiff's legal
right, as set forth in the petition, before the whole case will
be cognizable in equity.40
It has been quite uniformly held that the affirmative
equitable defense so interposed should be tried by the court
in the first instance before the rest of the issues are con-
sidered.4 1  However, this is not the invariable rule except
35. Card v. Deans, 84 Neb., 4; Maas v. Dunmyer, 21 Okla., 431; Lom.
bard v. Cowham. 34 Win., 486; Marling v." Burlington, Cedar Rapids and
Northern Ry.. 67 Ia., 331.
36. Lewis v. Rhodes, 150 Mo., 498; Allen v. Logan, 96 Mo.. 591.
37. Locke v. Moulton, 108 Cal., 49; Sloan v. Courtenay, 54 S. Car., 314.
38. Marling v. Burlington. Cedar Rapids & Northern Ry., 67 Ia., 331;
Withers v. K. C. Suburban Belt Ry. Co.. 226 Mo., 373.
39. Thompson v. National Bank of Commerce, 132 Mo. App., 225;
Shaffer v. Detie, 191 Mo., 377.
40. O'Day v. Conn, 131 Mo.. 321; Schuster v. Schuster, 93 Mo., 443.
41. Peterson v. Phila. Mortgage & Trust Co.. 33 Wash.. 464; Penninger
Lateral Co. Ltd. v. Clark, 22 Idaho, 397; Cotton v. Butterfleld and Demares,
14 N. Dak., 465; Hotaling v. Tecu seh National Bank, 55 Neb., 5.
236
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when the defendant's allegations really entitle him to affirm-
ative relief and are of such a character as would result, if
established, in superseding and destroying the plaintiff's
action at law.4 2
If the affirmative equitable defense is established so that
it entirely supersedes the plaintiff's claim, there being nothing
further to try, there is of course no occasion for a jury truil.4
But on the other hand, if the affirmative equitable defense
or counterclaim is adjudged insufficient and does not super-
sede the plaintiff's action, we are confronted with a much
more difficult question. When the cross action is deemed
insufficient and is decided against the defendant, will the
plaintiff be entitled to a trial by jury on his original claim or
wvill the whole case remain in equity to be tried by the court?
It is a well recognized rule that when a court of equity
-,equires jurisdiction over a cause for any purpose, it may
retain the cause for all purposes and proceed to a final de-
termination of all matters put in issue in the case."
And it would seem that the court of equity, having acquired
jurisdiction by the interposition and trial of the affirmative
equitable defense, would retain such jurisdiction to final
.judgment. But however plausible that may be, such is not
the rule in" a great many Stat 3s. It is in those jurisdictions
established that if the affirmative equitable defense is held
insufficient and does not supersede and extinguish the issues
of the petition, the original claim or legal issues should be
tried by a jury 5 These decisions are based on the theory
42. Swasey v. Adair. U3 Cal., 179.
43. Cornelius v. Kessel, 58 Wis.. 237; Cotton v. Butterfield and De-
mares. 14 N. Dak.. 465.
44. 1 Pomeroy Equity Jurisprudence. sec. 181; 1 Story Equity Jurs-
prudence. 70; Gantz v. Gease. 82 Ohio St., 34; Morrissey V. Broolnal, 37
Neb., 766.
45. Smith v. Moberly and wife. 54 Ky. (B. Mon.) 70; Buckner v. Mear,
26 Ohio St.. 514; Corbin v. Pollock, 28 Iowa, 596; Moline Plow Co. v.
Hartman, 840 Mo.. 610; Pattison's Mo. Code Pleading (2nd. Ed.) p. 19;
Swasey v. Adair. 88 Cal.. 179; Miller v. St. Louis & Kansas City Ry. Co..
162 Mo., 424; Parker v. Daly. 58 Ore., 564.
237
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that the court of equity acquires jurisdiction or the cause
merely for the purpose of trying the affirmative equitable
defense, and if it is not sustained, the plaintiff may proceed
with his cause of action in a trial at law. So it is held in many
of the de States that if the trial of the equitable defense
does not obviate the necessity of a trial of the issues of law,
they must be tried in the same manner as if no equitable
defense had been interposed. 46 And there is a decision in
our oxn State of Missouri, not overruled, which holds that
if in a case of this kind the equitable defense is denied, the
remaining legal issues should be submitted to a jury.4' That
decision was founded on the proposition that the pleading of
an affirmative equitable defense does not convert the suit into
an equity case unless there exists in the defense some equity
upon which the court of chancery exercises its peculiar juris-
diction. However, the question seems to be involved in con-
siderable difficulty because in so many cases the courts have
overlooked the point, when there was nothing more to be
tried after the equitable defense was denied; and have been
very reluctant in ruling upon the question.
In the discussion of the cases, we have treated of the plain-
tiff's and not of the defendant's right of trial by jury. But
this may be disposed of by saying that the defendant is not
entitled to demand a jury trial when he sets up an affirmative
equitable defense for the same reason that if, instead of inter-
posing the defense, he had instituted his claim as a separate
action against the plaintiff, he would not have a right of trial
by jury.
In the review of authorities immediately preceding, actions
at law with equitable defenses pleaded have been considered.
We will now turn to a brief consideration of those cases
originally brought in equity and to which legal defenses are
interposed. There is a general unanimity of opinion in the
46. Swasey v. Adalr, 88 CaL, 179.
47. Ml1er v. St. Louis & Kansas City Ry. Co., 162 Mo., 424.
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various States that in cases properly brought in equity, there
is no right to have any issues of fact tried by a jury, and
this, even though a legal defense in the nature of a counter4
claim is pleaded. 48 While there are a few cases to the con-
trary,49 it is the ivell established rule in most of the American
States that where a counterclaim or a defense of an affirm-
ative legal nature is interposed, it cannot interject into the
equitable action a new legal cause of action but the action
remains in equity and is not triable of right by a jury.6°
In conclusion, it may be said that the reformed procedure
as adopted in the Codes of Civil Procedure of many Ameri-
can States has not substantially changed the right of trial
by .jury as it existed at common law any more than it has
uiltered the old essential distinctions between law and equity.
.%s the adoption of the code re.orm only brought about a
procedural change, it did not materially alter the substantive
ri-it of trial by jury. The right of trial by jury survives
today in practically the same form as it existed before the
adoption of the codes of civil procedure and at the time of
the adoption of the State constitutions; and it may cer-
tainly be sid that the right of trial by jury in civil cases,
"as heretofore enjoyed," has truly been preserved inviolate
by the courts of all the States that have adopted the reformed
procedure.
In these jurisdictions today, as at common law, a party is
absolutely entitled to a trial by jury in civil cases as a matter
of right, wherever issues of fact arise upon the pleadings in
an ordinary action at law justiciable in a regular court tof or-
dinary jurisdiction.
ROBERT WILSON BARRow, '22
48. McBrile v. Stradley, 103 Ind., 465; Ryman v. Lynch. 76 Iowa, 587;
McLaurin v. Hodges. 43 S. Car.. 187.
49. Sandstrom v. Smith, 12 Idaho. 446; Robertson v. Moore. 10 Idaho.
115.
50. Crissman v. MeDuff, 114 Iowa. 83; Morrissey v. Broomal. 37 Neb..
7F6; Johnson Service Co. v. Kruse, 121 Minn., 28; Reichert v. Krass. 13
Ind. App., 348.
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